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Introduction
In a Bayesian framework, when the relevant information is dispersed among
several agents, the designer of a decision mechanism must take into account
what they know about each other. Many authors have exploited the general
properties of such information structures to construct decision procedures or
contracts in many different types of allocation problems. The first applications
have belonged to public economics and to the study of collective decision
making, where the problem is to achieve an optimal allocation of resources,
despite market failures due to externalities or to public goods, and despite
strategic behavior, free-riding and misreporting of preferences. Starting with
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), the problem has been framed as the con-
struction of balanced transfers to obtain an optimal allocation compatible with
individual incentives. First, it was shown that, in general, there did not exist
dominant strategy mechanisms with balanced transfers (see Green and Laffont
1979 andWalker 1980). Followed positive answers in Bayesian frameworks by,
among others, d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1975, 1979, 1982), Arrow
(1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979), Johnson et al. (1990), d’Aspremont et al.
(1990).
Another line of research, starting with Vickrey (1961), is devoted to the
design of auctions (Myerson 1981; Milgrom and Weber 1982; Cre´mer and
McLean 1985, 1988 and, for a survey of the early literature, McAfee and
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McMillan 1987). Rather than maximizing the profit of the seller, one can also
try to find efficient bilateral or multilateral trading mechanisms (Chatterjee
and Samuelson 1983; Wilson 1985; Leininger, et al. 1989; Satterwhaite and
Williams 1989). In a more applied vein, Cramton et al. (1987) have studied
the related problem of reallocating efficiently the shares of an asset owned by
agents who value it differently.
The general problem of mechanism design also has applications in
industrial organization. Roberts (1985), Cramton and Palfrey (1990) and
others have studied optimal cartel agreements when firms have private
information about their own costs. Riordan (1984) has studied agreements
between firms and their suppliers, while Bhattacharya et al. (1992) and
d’Aspremont et al. (1993) have studied various forms of R&D contracting.
The same general framework has also been applied to the internal organi-
zation of the firm, see Cre´mer and Riordan (1987).
The goal of the present paper is to describe the state of the art on Bayesian
mechanisms when utility is transferable and only balanced transfers are
admissible. New results will be proved along the way, but they will be inte-
grated to the overall picture. This description will be organised around three
main questions. The first is:
What is the role of correlation among the types of agents in the resolution of
incentive problems with balanced transfers?
Following the first work on Bayesian mechanisms by d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet (1975) and Arrow (1979), it was generally accepted that inde-
pendence of types was the central sufficient condition to find Pareto-efficient
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (Groves and Ledyard 1980). Even
the more general ‘‘compatibility condition’’ (condition C), introduced in
d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979) as a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of efficient Bayesian mechanisms, was often interpreted as a general-
isation of independence (see, for instance, Fudenberg et al. 1994). In a two
agents framework, where condition C coincides with independence,
d’Aspremont et al. (1990) reinforce this intuition by building a counterex-
ample to the existence of efficient Bayesian mechanisms using strong corre-
lation between the types of the agents.
On the other hand, studying optimal auctions, Myerson (1981), Maskin
and Riley (1980), and Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) show that some
correlation between types is necessary and sufficient for the seller to do very
well indeed, as well as if he had full information about the types of the
bidders. Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) survey multi-agents adverse selection
problems stressing this feature.
The data is therefore mixed: correlation seems to help in some cases, and
gets in the way in others. In this paper, we show that correlation enables us to
implement all sorts of decision rules, those taken on behalf of the agents, but
also those that go against their best interest. Independence prevents us from
implementing decision rules that are not efficient from the viewpoint of the
agents, but is useful when we are trying to take decisions in their best interest.
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The second main question that we ask is
Can we in general find Bayesian mechanisms which balance the budget?
The early literature on efficient Bayesian mechanisms was motivated by
the existence issue. In general, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, which
use dominant strategies, cannot balance the budget, and obtaining existence
with budget balance was the main reason for the use of the concept of
Bayesian equilibrium. In d’Aspremont et al. (1990), we show that generi-
cally one can find such mechanisms, as long as there are at least three
agents and as long as we try to implement efficient decisions. In the present
paper, we reinforce this result by showing that it holds for all decisions,
even if they are not efficient. Moreover, the proof will be constructive: we
will exhibit a class of balanced transfer rules that, generically, are sufficient
to implement any public decision.
The implicit message that transpires from all the attempts to find condi-
tions under which there exist Bayesian mechanisms is that existence is difficult
to establish, even with the assumption that utility is transferable. Actually,
with this assumption, it is very difficult to find environments where efficient
Bayesian mechanisms do not exist, and in this paper we provide the first
example of an environment with more than two agents for which an efficient
mechanism does not exist.
The third question that we ask is:
Is it possible to find Bayesian mechanisms that balance the budget and that
have unique equilibria?
Palfrey (1992) surveys the extensive literature on unique Bayesian
implementation. We exhibit here new conditions that allow us to go from
implementation to unique implementation and show that they hold gener-
ically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the general defini-
tions. Section 2 studies a condition on the information structure1 (called
condition B), which is stronger than the compatibility condition, but is nec-
essary and sufficient to guarantee implementation of any decision rule. The
main result of this section is that this condition holds generically, and the
proof is constructive: in nearly all environments, and for any decision rule, it
provides a technique for building a Bayesian mechanism that implements it.
In Sect. 3, we return to condition C, providing a simple interpretation, which
enables us to link the literature on Bayesian mechanism to the literature on
dominant strategy mechanisms. Also, we build a counterexample showing
that condition C is not necessary to guarantee implementation of efficient
decision rules. Furthermore, we provide the first necessary and sufficient
condition in the literature for an information structure to guarantee that any
1 Information structures, defined formally below, are probability distributions over
the types of agents.
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efficient decision rule can be implemented, whatever the utility of the agents.
Section 4 exhibits what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first proof that
there does not always exist efficient Bayesian mechanisms, with three agents.
The information structures that we use to construct counterexamples have
some interest of their own. Finally, in Sect. 5, we exhibit conditions on the
information structures that guarantee unique implementation, and show that
they hold generically. We discuss some open questions in the conclusion,
Sect. 6.
1 Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
1.1 The environment
A planner is designing a mechanism for the set N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng of agents.
Except when the opposite is explicitly stated, n will be assumed to be at least
equal to 3. These agents may not be the only ones affected by the decision that
will be taken, but they are the only ones whose preferences will be taken into
account.
A public decision x must be chosen in a set X, which may be finite or
infinite. In many problems X would be an interval of the real line, and would
represent the size of some public equipment, or as, in Riordan (1984), the
quantity of a good transferred between a supplier and a client. In other
problems, it could be a set of real vectors and represent transfers of several
goods and services among the agents.
All the private information of agent i 2N is represented by his type ai
which belongs to a finite setAi. A vector of possible types is denoted a and is
an element of A ¼ Qi2NAi.
The payoff of an agent depends on the public decision, his type and, since
we assume that utility is transferable, the monetary transfer (which could be
negative) that he receives from the planner: if the public decision is x, his type
is ai and he receives a monetary transfer ti from the planner, the ‘‘quasi-
linear’’ payoff of agent i is
uiðx; aiÞ þ ti:
Most of our results go through if the utility of agent i is a function from
XA into <, that is if the types of the other agents also influence the value
that he attaches to decisions — the so-called ‘‘common value’’ case. In eco-
nomic terms, this generalization is significant. In many cases, when a public
decision is taken agents possess private information that would influence the
evaluation of the possible choices by the other agents.
The type of agent i can also affect his beliefs about the types of the other
agents. When he is of type ai these beliefs are represented by a probability
distribution piðai j aiÞ overAi ¼
Q
j2NiAj, the set of the possible types of
the others. We will assume that there exists a probability distribution p onA
such that pi is obtained from p by taking the conditionalization with respect
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to ai, i.e. piðai j aiÞ ¼ pðai j aiÞ ¼ p að Þ=pðaiÞ: the beliefs are ‘‘consistent’’.2
We assume that the marginal distribution pðaiÞ is strictly positive for all i and
all ai.
We will need the following notation. For i 6¼ j,
Aij ¼
Y
k=2fi;jg
Ak
is the set of possible types of agents other than i and j. For every aij 2
Aij, the distribution p aij j ai
 
represents the beliefs of agent i on the
types of agents other than himself and j, while p aj j ai
 
are the beliefs of
agent i on the type of agent j. (Notice that from this point on, in order to
lighten the notation, we are dropping the subscripts on the conditional
probabilities.)
We will make repeated use of the notion of information structure, that is
the 3-tuple ðN;A; pÞ.
The type of an agent refers to a joint realization of his utility function and
probability distribution. When the type varies at least one of these elements
changes, and our analysis goes through if only one changes. For instance,
there could exist two types ai and a0i such that uiðx; aiÞ is equal to uiðx; a0iÞ for
all x 2 X, and that pð j aiÞ is not equal to pð j a0iÞ. In this case ai and a0i differ
only by the information available to agent i.
All these notions define an environment
E ¼ ðfN;A; pg;X; fuigi2NÞ;
which is composed of an information structure, a set of outcomes and utility
functions for the agents.
1.2 Implementation
The planner would like the choice of the decision to be sensitive to the state of
nature.More precisely, hewould like to implement a decision rule s, defined by a
function fromA intoX: for a vector a of types the public decision sðaÞ is taken.
A decision rule is efficient, and usually written s, if for all a 2A and all
x 2 X:
X
i2N
uiðsðaÞ; aiÞ 
X
i2N
uiðx; aiÞ:
In order to implement a decision rule s, the planner gathers information from
the agents. He uses a mechanism in which the strategies of the agents are the
messages that they send. Formally, we have the following definitions.
A mechanism consists of a set of message spaces, M ¼ fM1;M2; . . . ;Mng,
2 We make this assumption mainly for ease of presentation. Our results go through if
we assume that the informations of the agents are not consistent, i.e., that the pið j aiÞ
are not obtained from a well-defined p.
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together with an outcome function ðxðÞ; tðÞÞ that associates to any vector of
messages m 2M a public decision xðmÞ 2 X and a vector of transfers
tðmÞ 2 <n. This transfer rule must balance the budget:
X
i2N
tiðmÞ ¼ 0 for all m 2M:
A mechanism determines a game with incomplete information. A Bayesian
equilibrium for such a game is a vector of strategies ~m ¼ ð ~m1; . . . ; ~mnÞ where
each ~mi is a function from Ai to Mi such that
X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðxð ~mðaÞ; aiÞ þ tið ~mðaÞÞ½ 

X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðxðmi; ~miðaiÞ; aiÞ þ tiðmi; ~miðaiÞÞ½ 
for all i 2N; and all ai 2Ai and all mi 2Mi: ðBICÞ
The mechanism ðM; x; tÞ implements the decision rule s if there exists a
Bayesian equilibrium ~m such that xð ~mðaÞÞ ¼ sðaÞ for all3 a 2A. The mech-
anism ðM; x; tÞ uniquely implements the decision rule s if it implements s and
the Bayesian equilibrium ~m is unique.
In the first part of the paper, we identify information structures such that
all decision rules (or all efficient decision rules) can be implemented. In order
to study this issue, we use the revelation principle4 and restrict ourselves to
the class of direct mechanisms for which Mi ¼Ai for all i 2N: a message
simply consists in announcing a type. Moreover, each agent is induced to
announce his true type: ~mðaÞ ¼ a for all a. In this case xðaÞ ¼ sðaÞ: the public
decision function x can be identified with the decision rule s which is to
be implemented. Finding a direct mechanism ðs; tÞ that implements s is
therefore equivalent to finding a (monetary) transfer rule t : A! <n which is
balanced,
X
i2N
tiðaÞ ¼ 0 for all a 2A; ð1Þ
and satisfies the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints
3 Even if we neglect the issue of unicity of equilibrium, which we tackle in Sect. 5, our
use of terms is different from the language in the literature on implementation. In the
spirit of that literature, we would have to give ourselves an incentive compatible set of
decisions and transfers, and find an equivalent mechanism that uniquely implements
them (see Palfrey 2002).
4 See Holmstrom (1977), Dasgupta et al. (1979), Myerson (1979) and Harris and
Townsend (1981).
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Xai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðsðai; aiÞ; aiÞ þ tiðai; aiÞ½ 

X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðsðeai; aiÞ; aiÞ þ tiðeai; aiÞ½ 
for all i 2N; and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i ; ðB1C0Þ
where
A2i ¼ fðai;eaiÞ j ai;eai 2Ai; ai 6¼ eaig:
We will use the following terminology. An information structure ðN;A; pÞ
guarantees implementation of all public decision rules 5 if for every outcome set6
X, every utility functions ui : XAi!<, i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, and every decision rule
s, there exists a balanced transfer rule t such that the associated direct mecha-
nism ðs; tÞ implements s, i.e., satisfies ðBIC0Þ. Similar definitions will be used for
information structures that guarantee strict implementation (when the
inequalities ðBIC0Þ are strict), implementation of efficient decision rules (when s is
an efficient decision rule).
All our results hold true if we add an ex-ante individual rationality con-
straint of the form
X
a2A
pðaÞ uiðsðaÞ; aiÞ þ tiðaÞ½   0;
as long as there is a status quo decision that guarantees each agent a utility of
0. A more general and more precise statement is provided by the following
result, which states that if the planner can guarantee an expected aggregate
surplus at least equal to A, then he can allocate this surplus anyway he wishes
among the agents.
Theorem 1. Assume that for some real A
X
a2A
pðaÞ
X
i2N
uiðsðaÞ; aiÞ
" #
 A;
and that there exists a direct mechanism ðs; t0Þ that implements s (i.e., t0 is
balanced and ðs; t0Þ satisfies ðBIC0Þ), then for any family of real numbers
fBigfi2Ng such that
5 Of course, a mechanism designer is only interested in guaranteeing implementation
of a specific decision rule. We study implementation of all decision rules because it
provides sufficient conditions for the problem of any mechanism designer to be
solvable. Our results can be reinterpreted as showing that all mechanism designers can
nearly always implement the decision rule they are interested in.
6 Because we have only a finite set of types, only a finite subset of decisions are really
relevant. The fact that the set X varies does not create any difficulty, and we could
keep it fixed without changing the results if its cardinality was at least equal to that of
A.
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Xi2N
Bi  A
there exists another direct mechanism ðs; tÞ that implements s and such that
X
a2A
pðaÞ uiðsðaÞ; aiÞ þ tiðaÞ½   Bi for all i:
Proof. Write
P
a2A pðaÞ uiðsðaÞ; aiÞ þ t0iðaÞ
  ¼ Ai: Budget balance impliesP
i2N Ai  A. For i 6¼ 1 let tiðaÞ ¼ t0iðaÞ þ Bi  Ai and let t1ðaÞ ¼ 
P
i 6¼1 tiðaÞ.
The mechanism ðs; tÞ implements s and is such that the ex ante expected
payoff is equal to Bi, for all i 6¼ 1, and larger than or equal to
APi 6¼1 Bi  B1 for i ¼ 1: j
For technical reasons, which will become clear later, and in order to
lighten the notation, it is convenient to collapse the utility function of the
agents and the decision rule. A decision rule being given, we therefore redefine
the functions ui to be functions from AAi into <, such that uiða0; aiÞ is
reinterpreted as the old uiðsða0Þ; aiÞ — this is equivalent to setting X ¼A,
which we can do without loss of generality.
Incentive compatibility is then written
X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðai; ai; aiÞ þ tiðai; aiÞ½ 

X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ uiðeai; ai; aiÞ þ tiðeai; aiÞ½ 
for all i 2N; and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i : (BIC’’)
When the decision rule is efficient we will use the notation ui ða0; aÞ for
uiðsða0Þ; aÞ. Efficiency implies
X
i2N
ui ða; aiÞ 
X
i2N
ui ða0; aiÞ for all a0 6¼ a. ð2Þ
We then say that the ui ’s are efficient.
2 Implementing all decision rules
In this section, we characterize information structures that guarantee imple-
mentation of all decision rules and we show in Subsect. 2.2 that, as long as
there are at least three agents, nearly all information structures satisfy this
property. We make no assumption about the objectives of the planner, and
assume that the net aggregate transfers between him and the agents are equal
to 0. For instance, one could imagine the following types of circumstances:
The planner already knows the utility of consumers and must gather only
information from firms about their costs. Then, the agents of our framework
are the firms, and it is not the sum of their utilities that must be maximized.
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2.1 Condition B
We will need the following condition introduced by d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet (1982):
Condition 1 (Condition B). An information structure satisfies condition B if and
only if there exists a balanced tranfer rule tB such that for all i 2N and all
ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i we have
X
ai2Ai
tBi ðai; aiÞpðai j aiÞ >
X
ai2Ai
tBi ðai;eaiÞpðai j aiÞ: ð3Þ
The following result was first proved in d’Aspremont et al. (1987) and
Johnson et al. (1990). We present a much more transparent proof.
Theorem 2. Condition B guarantees strict implementation of all decision rules.
If the information structure ðN;A; pÞ guarantees implementation of all deci-
sion rules, then condition B holds.
Proof. It is easy to prove that if condition B holds any decision rule can be
implemented: use the transfers satisfying (3) multiplied by a positive number
large enough that, from the point of view of the agents, the monetary
incentives to reveal their true types dominate the incentives they would have
to lie in order to modify the decision.
It is more difficult to show that condition B holds for every information
structure ðN;A; pÞ that guarantees implementation of all decision rules.
Choose any ði; a0i Þ 2NAi and define an environment, Eði;a
0
i Þ, for which the
information structure is ðN;A; pÞ and whose characterization is completed
as follows:
uiðai; a0i ; a0i Þ ¼ 1 for all ai;
ujða;eajÞ ¼ 0 if ðj; aj;eajÞ 6¼ ði; a0i ; a0i Þ:
Notice that the decision rule that we are implementing minimizes the sum
of the utilities of the agents. Because it can be implemented, there exists a
balanced transfer function tði;a
0
i Þ that satisfies the following equations,
X
ai2Ai
pðai j a0i Þ tði;a
0
i Þ
i ðai; a0i Þ  tði;a
0
i Þ
i ðai;eaiÞ
h i

X
ai2Ai
pðai j a0i Þ uiðai;eai; a0i Þ  uiðai; a0i ; a0i Þ
  ¼ 1 for all eai 6¼ a0i ;
ð4Þ
and
X
aj2Aj
pðaj j ajÞ tði;a
0
i Þ
j ðaj; ajÞ  tði;a
0
i Þ
j ðaj;eajÞ
h i

X
aj2Aj
pðaj j ajÞ ujðaj;eaj; ajÞ  ujðaj; aj; ajÞ
  ¼ 0
for all ðj; ajÞ 6¼ ði; a0i Þ and eaj 6¼ aj: ð5Þ
Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives 289
Repeating this construction for every i 2N and every a0i 2Ai, and using
Eqs. (4) and (5) the transfer rule obtained by summing up the tði;a
0
i Þ’s over all
i 2N and all a0i 2Ai satisfies Eq. (3), and the result is proved. j
If condition B holds, in order to implement a decision rule, the planner
needs to know very little about the utility functions of the agents: he only
needs to know an upper bound on the maximum willingness to pay to change
the decision,
max
i;ai;ea;a0
juiða0; aiÞ  uiðea; aiÞj:
As is well-known, guaranteeing implementation of any efficient decision rule
can be obtained by assuming a condition of independence of types.7 We now
show that independence of types precludes implementation of all8 decision
rules. Formally, for any agent i, we say that the types ai and eai are independent
if
pðai j aiÞ ¼ pðai j eaiÞ for all ai 2Ai.
Agent i has free beliefs if all pairs of types ai and eai are independent. Inde-
pendence of types holds when all agents have free beliefs.
Corollary 1. If condition B holds no two types of any agent can be independent,
and therefore in any information structure that guarantees implementation of all
decision rules no two types of any agent can be independent.
Proof. For condition B to hold Eq. (3) must hold, and it must hold with the
roles of ai and eai inverted, which is clearly impossible if they are indepen-
dent. j
As we will see in Sect. 4, the reverse implication does not hold. There exist
information structures such that no two types of any agent are independent,
and such that condition B does not hold.
The conclusions of Theorem 2 can be extended to the common value case
where the utilities of the agents depend not only on their types but also on the
types of the other agents. The only if part holds, since it is stronger than
needed, and the if part can easily be adapted.
This enables us to weaken the budget balance constraint:
Corollary 2. If the budget balance condition (1) is replaced by
7 See d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1975) and Arrow (1979).
8 One could weaken the requirement that all decision rules be implemented. For
instance, with independence of types, Laffont and Maskin (1979) show that it is
impossible to implement a decision rule that maximizes a strictly concave and
increasing function of the ui’s, even if one limits oneself to quadratic valuation
functions.
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Xi2N
tiðaÞ ¼ RðaÞ for all a 2A
for some function R : A! <, condition B is still necessary for the implemen-
tation of all decision rules, and sufficient for the strict implementation of all
decision rules.
Proof. By the discussion of the common value case that precedes the state-
ment of the theorem, we can implement the decision rule u0iðea; aÞ ¼
uiðea; aiÞ þ RðaÞ=n, and this implies the corollary. j
If in the proof of Corollary 2 one assumes that all ui’s are uniformly equal
to zero, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3. An information structure satisfies condition B if and only if for all
functions R : A! <, there exists a transfer rule tB such that for all a 2A
X
i2N
tBi ðaÞ ¼ RðaÞ;
and such that for all i 2N and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i we have:
X
ai2Ai
tBi ðai; aiÞpðai j aiÞ >
X
ai2Ai
tBi ðai;eaiÞpðai j aiÞ:
2.2. Genericity
It is rather remarkable that, as we will show in this subsection, condition B
holds for nearly all information structures as long as there are at least
three agents, each with at least two types, and therefore that nearly
all information structures guarantee strict implementation of all decision
rules. The proof is constructive: for nearly all environments, it provides a
technique of construction of transfers that allow implementation of all
decision rules.
For a given set A of states of nature, the set of vectors of probabilities
pðaÞ is the simplex of <A. A property holds for nearly all information
structures if it holds in an open and dense (according to the standard
topologies) subset of all probability distributions p in the simplex corre-
sponding to any N.
Theorem 3. If N contains at least three agents, each with at least two types,
condition B holds for nearly all information structures.
The technique of proof uses ‘‘scoring rules’’ introduced by Good (1952),
discussed by Savage (1974), and applied to Bayesian implementation by
Johnson et al. (1990): An agent who maximizes expected value will state his
true probability distribution over events, when in each state of nature he
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is paid proportionally to the logarithm of the probability that he announced
ex-ante for that state.
Proof. Addition and subtraction on the indices of agents are defined modulo
n so that nþ 1  1 and 1 1  n. For all i and all ai we assume (and this
holds generically) that piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ > 0 for all ai i1ð Þ, and that
piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ > 0 for all ai iþ1ð Þ. Define tBðaÞ by
tBi ðaÞ ¼ ½log piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ  log piðai i1ð Þ j ai1Þ
þ ½log piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ  log piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiþ1Þ:
The negative terms are constant in ai and do not influence the incentives of
agent i, but they ensure that the transfer rule is balanced. This implies, for all
i, all ai and all eai,
X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ½tiðai;eaiÞ  tiðai; aiÞ
¼
X
ai2Ai
pðai j aiÞ½log
piðai i1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ
þ log piðai iþ1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ

¼
X
aiði1Þ2Aiði1Þ
pðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ log
piðai i1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ
þ
X
aiðiþ1Þ2Aiðiþ1Þ
pðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ log
piðai iþ1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ
 log
X
aiði1Þ2Aiði1Þ
pðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ
piðai i1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ
þ log
X
aiðiþ1Þ2Aiðiþ1Þ
pðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ
piðai iþ1ð Þ j ~aiÞ
piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ
¼ 0
where the inequality is a consequence of the concavity of the function log.
Since, each i has at least two types, generically for all i, all ai and all eai, either
piðai i1ð Þ j aiÞ 6¼ piðai i1ð Þ j ~aiÞ for some ai i1ð Þ, or piðai iþ1ð Þ j aiÞ 6¼
piðai iþ1ð Þ j ~aiÞ for some ai iþ1ð Þ, and because the function log is strictly
concave, the above inequality is generically strict: it holds in an open and dense
subset of all probability distributions p. Since the intersection of open and dense
subsets is open and dense9 conditionB holds on an open and dense subset of the
set of probability distributions, which proves the result. j
In contrast, condition B never holds with only two agents. Indeed,
d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) show that in the two-agent case
condition C, which is defined and shown to be weaker than condition B in the
9 See, for instance, Hirsch and Smale (1974), Sect. 7.3.
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next section, is equivalent to independence of types. By corollary 1, this
implies that condition B never holds for two agents. Also, with more than two
agents but some without private information (i.e., of a single type), genericity
fails (see Forges et al. 2002).
3 Implementing efficient decision rules
In many cases, the planner acts on behalf of the agents, and tries to imple-
ment an efficient decision rule. In this section, we study the environments in
which he can do so.
When condition B holds, the planner has tools to provide strict incentives
to the agents to reveal their true types, the transfers tBi . Multiplied by a large
enough constant they overwhelm any incentive to ‘‘lie’’ that would be created
by the desire to influence the choice of the public decision. We introduce a
condition C which is more modest – it simply states that we can collect from
the agents any aggregate transfer, dependent on the state of nature, without
inciting them to lie – and we will show in turn the following properties:
1. Condition C guarantees implementation of efficient decision rules10;
2. It is equivalent11 to, but simpler to interpret than, another condition in-
troduced by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) (also called C, but
called here C, as it is the dual form of C) and to LINK, a complex
condition introduced by Johnson et al. (1990);
3. It is obtained, in a precise sense, by allowing some independence in con-
dition B;
4. It is not necessary for the implementability of all efficient decision rules.
However, we present a necessary and sufficient, but quite complicated,
condition in Theorem 9.
In d’Aspremont et al. (2003), we show that condition C is more general (i.e.,
strictly less restrictive) than all the other sufficient conditions12 for the
existence of balanced-transfer Bayesian mechanisms that have been proposed
in the literature, except for LINK, to which it is equivalent. Here we prove
other properties13 of condition C.
10 The direct proof given here (see theorem 4 below) is also given in d’Aspremont et al.
(2003), where we also show that condition C is equivalent to ‘‘guaranteeing budget
balance’’: condition C holds if and only if whenever a BIC-mechanism exists, then
there exists another one with a balanced transfer rule.
11 This is shown in Theorem 8 below. This theorem, together with Theorem 2 in
d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982), provides an alternative proof of Theorem 4.
12 Matsushima’s (1991) regularity condition, Chung’s (1999) weak regularity condition
(which is equivalent to Assumption I(i) in Aoyagi (1998)) and Fudenberg et al. (1994,
1995) pairwise identifiability condition.
13 Theorems 5, 6 and 7 below.
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3.1 Condition C
We weaken condition B, in the equivalent form presented in Corollary 3, by
replacing the strict inequalities by weak inequalities:
Condition 2 (Condition C). An information structure satisfies condition C if and
only if for every function R : A! <, there exists a transfer rule tC such that for
all a 2A
X
i2N
tCi ðaÞ ¼ RðaÞ ð6Þ
and such that for all i 2N and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i we have:
X
ai2Ai
tCi ðai; aiÞpðai j aiÞ 
X
ai2Ai
tCi ðai;eaiÞpðai j aiÞ: ð7Þ
It is clear that condition C holds whenever condition B holds. Combined with
Theorem 3 this provides an alternate, and much simpler, proof of the result of
d’Aspremont et al. (1990) that condition C holds generically.
To see why condition C guarantees implementation of efficient decision
rules, we can imagine that the planner has set up two bureaus and sent to the
first, the ‘‘preference bureau’’, a description of the functions ui . The bureau
sends back a Vickrey-Clark-Groves transfer rule tG that implements this
efficient decision rule in dominant strategies, but without, in general, bal-
ancing the budget:
ui ða; aiÞ þ tGi ðaÞ  ui ðai;eai; aiÞ þ tGi ðai;eaiÞ for all i 2N;
all a 2A and all eai 2Ai:
Let R ¼ Pi2N tGi be the deficit. The preference bureau sends a message to a
second bureau called the ‘‘beliefs bureau’’, stating ‘‘we have been able to
provide incentives to the agents, but we are left with an aggregate deficit R’’.
If condition C holds, the beliefs bureau is able to find transfers tC that
satisfy Eqs. (6) and (7). It is immediate that the transfer rule t ¼ tG þ tC
balances the budget and provides the correct incentives. We have therefore
proved the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Any information structure that satisfies condition C guarantees
implementation of efficient decision rules.
Verifying that condition C holds looks like a formidable task: we have to
check that the system composed of Eqs. (6) and (7) has a solution for any
function R. The following result shows that the task, although computa-
tionally heavy, is still manageable.
Theorem 5. Condition C holds if and only if for any a 2A there exist transfer
rules tða;þÞ and tða;Þ such that
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Xi2N
tða;þÞi ðaÞ ¼ 1;
X
i2N
tða;Þi ðaÞ ¼ 1
X
i2N
tða;þÞi ða0Þ ¼
X
i2N
tða;Þi ða0Þ ¼ 0 for all a0 2A; a0 6¼ a;
and such that for all i 2N and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i condition (7) holds, when tC is
replaced by tða;þÞ or tða;Þ.
Proof. To prove necessity, it suffices, under condition C, to choose the proper
R to get tC ¼ tða;þÞ (resp. tC ¼ tða;Þ): by putting Rða0Þ ¼ 0 for all a0 6¼ a and
R að Þ ¼ 1 (resp. R að Þ ¼ 1). To show that the conditions of the theorem are
sufficient, assume that they hold. The transfers required for condition C can
then be built by the formula
tCi ðaÞ ¼
X
fa0:Rða0Þ0g
Rða0Þtða0;þÞi ðaÞ þ
X
fa0:Rða0Þ0g
ðRða0ÞÞtða0;Þi ðaÞ: j
It is well known that independence of the types of agents implies that condition
C holds (as already said, wewill defineC below, and prove that it is equivalent
to C). This can be weakened.14 For instance, it is sufficient to assume that one
agent has free beliefs. The following theorem generalizes these known results,
and uses a much simpler proof, thanks to the use of the primal version of
condition C and Theorem 5. We say that agents i and j have their types inde-
pendent of each other if : p aj j ai
 
p aið Þ ¼ p aj
 
p aið Þ ¼ p ai j aj
 
p aj
 
. Then:
Theorem 6. If there exists two agents whose types are independent of each
other condition C holds.
Proof. Assume that the types of agents 1 and 2 are independent. Pick any
a0 2A, and construct tða0;þÞ as follows:
tða
0;þÞ
i ðaÞ¼ 0 for all i 3 and all a2A;
tða
0;þÞ
1 ðaÞ¼ tða
0;þÞ
2 ðaÞ¼ 0 except:
tða
0;þÞ
1 ða0Þ ¼ 1pða02Þ; tða
0;þÞ
2 ða0Þ ¼ pða02Þ;
tða
0;þÞ
1 ða02;a2Þ¼pða02Þ; tða
0;þÞ
2 ða02;a2Þ¼ pða02Þ if a2 6¼ a02
It is easy to check that these transfers satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5. In
particular, to see that they satisfy condition (7), note that if agent 1 announces
a01, his expected payment is
14 We show that very little independence is required to guarantee implementation of
efficient decision rules. Another extension is to keep independence unchanged and to
strengthen the results. For instance, Cre´mer and Riordan (1985) show that if the types
of all agents are independent, there exists a balanced BIC mechanism in which all but
one agent have dominant strategies.
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½1 pða02Þpða02Þ  pða02Þ½1 pða02Þ ¼ 0;
which is equal to his expected payment if he announces any other a1.
(Remember that, because the types of agents 1 and 2 are independent,
pða2 j a1Þ ¼ pða2Þ for all a1 and a2.) Transfers tða0;Þ can simply be taken equal
to tða0;þÞ: j
Finally, it is immediate to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Condition C holds if an agent has only one possible type (Ai
contains only one element).
Proof. If agent 1 has only one type use t1 ¼ R, with the other ti’s identically
equal to 0. j
3.2 Dual form: Condition C
In this subsection we define a dual form of condition C, condition C, first
defined15 in d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982), and which will be useful
later. We need:
Definition 1 (Fundamental dual system). The system of equations
pðai j aiÞ
X
eai 6¼ai
kiðeai; aiÞ
2
4
3
5
X
eai 6¼ai
pðai j eaiÞkiðai;eaiÞ
2
4
3
5 ¼ lðaÞ
for all i 2N and all a 2A;
whose unknowns are the functions ki : A
2
i ! <þ and l : A! < is called the
fundamental dual system of equations associated with the information structure
ðN;A; pÞ.
Then the condition can be simply stated:
Condition 3 (condition C*). An information structure satisfies condition C if
all solutions of the associated fundamental dual system of equations satisfy
lðaÞ ¼ 0 for all a 2A.
Condition C is simply the dual of condition C, as the following theorem
shows.
Theorem 8. Condition C holds if and only if condition C holds.
15 This condition is close but slightly weaker than the ‘‘compatibility condition’’
introduced by d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979). See Johnson et al. (1990).
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Proof. Condition C can be rewritten: Whatever the function l : A! <, not
uniformly equal to zero, there exists no family of functions ki : A
2
i ! <þ that
satisfy
pðai j aiÞ
X
~ai 6¼ai
kiðeai; aiÞ 
X
~ai 6¼ai
pðai j eaiÞkiðai;eaiÞ ¼ lðaÞ
for all i 2N and all a 2A:
This can in turn be rewritten: Whatever the function R : A! <, not
uniformly equal to zero, there exists no family of functions ki : A
2
i ! <þ and
no function w : A! < that satisfy
pðai j aiÞ
X
eai 6¼ai
kiðeai; aiÞ 
X
eai 6¼ai
pðai j eaiÞkiðai;eaiÞ ¼ wðaÞ
for all i 2N and all a 2A.
X
a2A
wðaÞRðaÞ > 0
Using (e.g., as in Lemma 1 of d’Aspremont et al. (1990)) the duality of linear
inequalities,16 it follows straightforwardly that this condition is equivalent to
the existence of a tC that satisfies the required conditions. j
In d’Aspremont et al. (2003), we show that an information structure
ðN;A; pÞ satisfies condition B if and only if it satisfies condition C and for all
i 2N and all ðai;eaiÞ 2A2i there exists ai 2Ai such that
pðai j aiÞ 6¼ pðai j eaiÞ:
This shows that condition B is equivalent to condition C plus a no inde-
pendence of types condition. This answers in part the question that we asked
in the introduction about the role of correlation and independence in
implementation: Correlation (as in condition B) enables us to implement any
decision rule; independence allows us also to implement efficient decision
rules.
3.3 There exists information structures that do not satisfy condition C but
guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules
As soon as there are more than two agents, it becomes very difficult to find
examples of information structures that do not satisfy condition C.17 In this
subsection we present examples of such information structures that still
16 That is, using some theorem of the alternative: see for instance Fan (1956), Gale
(1960), or Mangasarian (1969).
17 As we have already mentioned, d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) show that
with two agents Condition C holds only if types are independent. This leaves open the
question when there are at least three agents, as we know that in this case condition C
holds for a much wider class of information structure.
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guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules. Hence, condition C is
not necessary to guarantee efficient implementation.
We will show that the information structures represented on Fig. 1
guarantees implementation of efficient decision rules and does not satisfy
condition C.
Efficiency turns out to be a tricky concept to handle in this type of
frameworks, and the proof is rather involved. The reader can skip it without
loss of continuity.
We begin by the following lemma. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first necessary and sufficient condition presented in the literature for an
information structure to guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules.
Theorem 9. An information structure ðN;A; pÞ guarantees implementation of
efficient decision rules if and only if for all ki’s and l’s solution of the funda-
mental dual system the system of equations in the unknowns vða;eaÞ, a 6¼ ea:
X
ea 6¼a
vða;eaÞ 
X
eai 6¼ai
vðeai; ai; ai; aiÞ ¼
X
eai 6¼ai
kiðeai; aiÞpðai j aiÞ
for all a and all i; ð8Þ
X
eai
vðeai;eai; aÞ ¼
X
eai 6¼ai
kðai;eaiÞpðai j eaiÞ
for all ai; ai;eai;eai 6¼ ai and all i, ð9Þ
vða;eaÞ  0 for all a 6¼ ea; ð10Þ
has a solution where the v’s are not all equal to 0.
Fig. 1. This figure represents a probability
structure that does not satisfy condition C
but guarantees implementation of efficient
decision rules. For instance, the probabil-
ity that a1 ¼ 1, a2 ¼ 2, a3 ¼ 1 is equal to
M , and the probability that a1 ¼ 3, a2 ¼ 1,
a3 ¼ 3 is equal to H . We assume
H  M  L, with at least one of these
inequalities strict, and, of course,
H þM þ L ¼ 1=9
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Proof. Using again the theory of duality of linear inequalities, Lemma 1 of
d’Aspremont et al. (1990) shows that, given utility functions ui for each agent
i 2N and an information structure ðN;A; pÞ, there exists a balanced
Bayesian mechanism if and only if the system of equations consisting of the
fundamental dual system and
X
i2N
X
A2i
kiðeai; aiÞ
X
ai2Ni
pðai j aiÞ½uiðeai; ai; aiÞ  uiðai; ai; aiÞ
" #
> 0
ð11Þ
does not have a solution.
Hence an information structure guarantees implementation of efficient
decision rules if and only if for all ui ’s satisfying Eq. (2) the system consisting
of the fundamental dual system and Eq. (11) does not have a solution. It
follows that an information structure guarantees implementation of efficient
decision rules if and only if for all ki’s and all l’s, solution of the fundamental
dual system – the system of equations composed of Eq. (2) and Eq. (11) –
does not have a solution. This proves the lemma as the system consisting of
Eqs. (8) to (10) is the dual of the system consisting of Eqs. (2) and (11), with
the unknowns being the utilities. j
In order to prove that the information structure represented by Fig. 1
guarantees efficient implementation we prove that it satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 9.
From the fundamental dual system we obtain
lð1; 1; 1Þ ¼ H ½k1ð2; 1Þ þ k1ð3; 1Þ  Lk1ð1; 2Þ Mk1ð1; 3Þ
¼ H ½k2ð2; 1Þ þ k2ð3; 1Þ Mk2ð1; 2Þ  Lk3ð1; 3Þ;
lð1; 1; 2Þ ¼ M ½k1ð2; 1Þ þ k1ð3; 1Þ  Hk1ð1; 2Þ  Lk1ð1; 3ÞÞ
¼ M ½k2ð2; 1Þ þ k2ð3; 1Þ  Lk2ð1; 2Þ  Hk3ð1; 3Þ;
lð1; 1; 3Þ ¼ L½k1ð2; 1Þ þ k1ð3; 1Þ Mk1ð1; 2Þ  Hk1ð1; 3Þ
¼ L½k2ð2; 1Þ þ k2ð3; 1Þ  Hk2ð1; 2Þ Mk3ð1; 3Þ:
ð12Þ
We define x2 ¼ k1ð1; 2Þ  k2ð1; 3Þ, x3 ¼ k1ð1; 3Þ  k2ð1; 2Þ and x1 ¼ x2 þ x3,
and we substitute in (12). Remembering that we cannot have H ¼ M ¼ L, we
then obtain x1 ¼ x2 ¼ x3 ¼ 0. Hence, k1ð1; 2Þ ¼ k2ð1; 3Þ, and k1ð1; 3Þ ¼
k2ð1; 2Þ.
Using repeatedly similar arguments, we can prove that for any solution of
the fundamental dual system there exist two non-negative real numbers, q and
r such that
q ¼ k1ð1; 2Þ ¼ k2ð1; 3Þ ¼ k3ð1; 3Þ ¼ k1ð2; 3Þ
¼ k2ð2; 1Þ ¼ k3ð2; 1Þ ¼ k1ð3; 1Þ ¼ k2ð3; 2Þ ¼ k3ð3; 2Þ ð13Þ
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and that the other ki’s are equal to r. One can check that any system of ki’s
satisfying these properties is, associated with the relevant l’s, a solution to the
fundamental dual system.
We can finally verify that the system of equations (8) to (10) has a solution
where the values of vða; eaÞ are represented on the following table:
(For instance, if pðaÞ ¼ H and pðeaÞ ¼ L, then vða; eaÞ ¼ r=3.)
From (12) and (13), lð1; 1; 1Þ ¼ 2Hq  LrMr, which can be made
different from 0. Hence, the information structure does not satisfy condition
C.
This proves the result.
4. There exist environments in which efficient decision rules
cannot be implemented
We have proved that condition C is sufficient but not necessary to guarantee
implementation of efficient decision rules; we know that nearly all informa-
tion structures satisfy condition C; a natural conjecture is that all information
structures guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules. In this section,
we show that this conjecture is false by displaying an example of an envi-
ronment where efficient mechanisms cannot be implemented.
Before beginning, we would like to point out that the literature is implicitly
misleading on this point. Many papers produce examples of sufficient condi-
tions for existence of BICmechanisms, leaving the impression that it is difficult
to prove existence. Actually, finding an information structure that does not
guarantee existence is the difficult part. In d’Aspremont et al. (1990), we have
shown that with two agents there do not always exist Bayesian mechanisms
that implement efficient decision rules. The restriction to two agents can create
very special results, as witnessed, for instance, by the fact that in this case
condition C is equivalent to independence. In this section, we show that the
fact that efficient decision rules cannot be implemented holds more generally.
We consider an environment with three agents, each having four types.
The states of nature are allocated in four subsets, which are described on
Fig. 2.
We assume that the information structure satisfies have
pðaÞ ¼
1
16 3e if a 2 H ,
e if a =2H ,

for some e < 1=49:
H pðeaÞM L
pðaÞ H 2ðqLþ rMÞ=3 q=3 r=3
M r=3 2ðqH þ rLÞ=3 q=3
L q=3 r=3 2ðqM þ rHÞ=3
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The utility functions of the agents are18
uiða; aiÞ ¼ 0 for all a and all i;
uiðeai; ai; aiÞ ¼ 1 if a 2 H and ðeai; aiÞ 2 M ;
uiðea; aiÞ ¼ 1 in all other cases.
(Small variations in these utility functions would not change the result). If the
transfers are equal to 0, for any ai there is exactly one type eai such that agent
i would have unambiguous incentives to announce eai rather than ai. For
instance, for
ða1;ea1Þ 2 fð1; 3Þ; ð2; 1Þ; ð3; 4Þ; ð4; 2Þg ð14Þ
agent 1 of type a1has an unambiguous incentive to announce ea1 as, depending
on the announcement of the other agents, this would never decrease his utility
and would sometimes increase it.
Fig. 2. The allocation of the
states of nature in 4 subsets for
the example of Sect. 4
18 It is easy to check that this utility function satisfies condition (2).
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Assume that there existed an efficient mechanism. Let ða
1
;ea1Þ satisfy (14).
For agent 1 of type a1 not to have any incentive to announce that he is of type
ea1 (i.e., for condition (BIC) to hold), we must have
1
4
 12e
 
½
X
ða1;a1Þ2H
t1ða1; a1Þ þ 4e
X
ða1;a1Þ=2H
½t1ða1; a1Þ
 1
4
 12e
 
½4þ
X
ða1;a1Þ2H
t1ðea1; a1Þ þ 4e
X
ða1;a1Þ=2H
½1þ t1ðea1; a1Þ
¼ 1
4
 12e
 
½4þ
X
ðea1;a1Þ2M
t1ðea1; a1Þ þ 4e
X
ðea1;a1Þ=2M
½1þ t1ðea1; a1Þ:
Add the four inequalities corresponding to the four pairs ða1;ea1Þ, we obtain
1
4
 12e
 X
a2H
t1ðaÞ þ 4e
X
a=2H
t1ðaÞ
 1
4
 12e
 
½16þ
X
a2M
t1ðaÞ þ 4e
X
a=2M
½1þ t1ðaÞ:
We can use the same reasoning19 for the two other agents to obtain, for all i,
1
4
 12e
 X
a2H
tiðaÞ þ 4e
X
a=2H
tiðaÞ
 1
4
 12e
 
½16þ
X
a2M
tiðaÞ þ 4e
X
a=2M
½1þ tiðaÞ;
Adding the three inequalities corresponding to the three agents yields
1
4
 12e
 X
a2H
ðt1ðaÞ þ t2ðaÞ þ t3ðaÞÞ þ 4e
X
a=2H
ðt1ðaÞ þ t2ðaÞ þ t3ðaÞÞ
 1
4
 12e
 
½48þ
X
a2M
ðt1ðaÞ þ t2ðaÞ þ t3ðaÞÞ
þ 4e½3þ
X
a=2M
ðt1ðaÞ þ t2ðaÞ þ t3ðaÞÞ;
which is by the budget balance equation (1) is equivalent to
0  12 588e  12 588 1
49
> 0;
and establishes the contradiction.
19 For instance, agent 2 of type 1 must not announce that he is of type 2, agent 2 of
type 2 not announce that he is of type 4, agent 2 of type 3 not announce that he is of
type 1, agent 2 of type 4 not announce that he is of type 3.
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5 Unique implementation
The results that we have presented up to now are subject to the traditional
criticism: they show that there exists one equilibrium with the requisite
properties, but there might exist other equilibria that do not have these
characteristics. Nothing guarantees that the ‘‘good’’ equilibrium will obtain.
Following the seminal contribution of Maskin (1977, 1985) on Nash imple-
mentation under complete information, a number of authors (e.g., Post-
lewaite and Schmeidler 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava 1991; Jackson 1991)
have addressed the problem of unique implementation under incomplete
information. They mainly concentrate on necessary conditions, such as the
extension of Maskin’s monotonicity condition, called ‘‘Bayesian monoto-
nicity’’, and incentive compatibility. The Bayesian monotonocity condition
restricts jointly the utilities and the probabilities. But, as shown in Palfrey
(1992), the possibility of ensuring unique implementation (under Bayesian
incentive compatibility and transferable utilities) may result from conditions
imposed on the belief structure only. As in Maskin’s original work, unique
implementation is obtained by enlarging the message space of the direct
mechanism to non-type messages, and these are of the kind introduced in Ma
et al. (1988) and used by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990). Applying a
similar technique of enlargement of the message space, we introduce a much
weaker condition on the probabilities alone to guarantee unique implemen-
tation of decision rules. We will prove the following theorem:20
Theorem 10. Consider any direct mechanism ðs; tÞ which is Bayesian incentive
compatible and budget-balanced. Assume that
pðai j aiÞ 6¼ pðeai j eaiÞ whenever ai 6¼ eai: ð15Þ
Then, there exists another mechanism ðM; x; sÞ that uniquely implements s.
Condition (15) holds for nearly all information structures21 Indeed, because
the conditional probabilities are continuous functions of the pðaÞ’s it is
straightforward that the set of information structures that satisfy it contains an
open neighbourhoodof any of its elements. The remaining task is to show that if
some information structure does not satisfy it, one can find another probability
structure arbitrarily close that satisfies this property. For that task, the
argument used to derive the genericity of condition C in d’Aspremont et al.
20 This is a generalization of Proposition 3 in d’Aspremont et al. (1999).
21 This condition plays a role similar to that of condition NCD (No Consistent
Deceptions) introduced by Matsushima (1990). Such conditions are indispensable if
we are to find conditions on information structures alone that guarantee unique
implementation. To see this, consider the case where the same utility function is
attached to two different types. We can only guarantee unique implementation if the
types generate different probability distributions over the types of the other agents.
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(1990) can be adapted. It consists in proving that any information structure that
does not satisfy the condition can be slightly modified in order to reduce the
number of equalities between conditional probabilities. A sequence of such
modifications will lead to an information structure that satisfies the condition.
In summary, the conclusion of the theorem holds for nearly all information
structures. By the genericity of condition B, which guarantees implementation
of all decision rules, this theorem has thus an important corollary:
Corollary 4. For nearly all information structures, all decision rules can be
uniquely implemented.
Notice that condition (15) is compatible with independence. Indeed, the
reasoning which leads to Corollary 4 can be repeated if we constrain the types
to be independent. Now, we know that with independence all decision rules
cannot be implemented, but we know that efficient decision rules can be
implemented. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5. For nearly all information structures satisfying independence, all
efficient decision rules can be uniquely implemented.
The proof of the theorem can be divided in two steps, each given by a
lemma which is of some interest per se. Before presenting the first lemma, we
notice that condition (15) implies the following condition:
For all i 6¼ j and all ðai; ajÞ 2Ai Aj;
pðaij; aj j aiÞ > 0, for some aij 2Aij: ð16Þ
Indeed, if (16) did not hold, we would have pðaij; aj j aiÞ ¼ 0 for all aij,
which contradicts (15).
Lemma 1. Consider any direct mechanism (s; t) which is Bayesian incentive
compatible and budget-balanced. Assume that for every i 6¼ j, condition (16)
holds and that for all i and all non trivial bijections22 c : Ai !Ai, there exist
eai 2Ai and eti : Ai ! < such that
P
ai2Ai
etiðaiÞpðcðaiÞ j eaiÞ > 0;
P
ai2Ai
etiðaiÞpðai j aiÞ < 0; for all ai 6¼ eai:
8
><
>:
ð17Þ
Then, there exists another mechanism ðM; x; sÞ which has a unique equilibrium
em and implements s.
Proof. We will actually show something stronger: we will not only show that
xðemðaÞÞ ¼ sðaÞ but also that sðemðaÞÞ ¼ tðaÞ for all a. To build the new
22 That is, bijections that are not the identity mapping.
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mechanism let us define first the set Hi of functions hi : Ai ! < such that
either hiðaiÞ ¼ 0 for all ai 2Ai, or
X
ai2Ai
hiðaiÞpðai j aiÞ < 0 for all ai 2Ai: ð18Þ
For every i we letMi ¼Ai  Hi. A message of agent i consists in announcing
a type ai in Ai and a function h
i in Hi. We define
xðða1; h1Þ; . . . ; ðan; hnÞÞ ¼ sðaÞ;
siðða1; h1Þ; . . . ; ðan; hnÞÞ ¼ tiðaÞ þ hiðaiÞ 
X
j2Ni
1
n 1 h
jðajÞ for all i:
It is clear that this transfer rule is balanced. It has a simple interpretation:
each agent i participates in the original mechanism, but is also allowed to ask
for contributions from the other agents, as long as these contributions are
guaranteed to give him a negative payoff in the truthtelling equilibrium.
In the augmented mechanism, for every agent i, let the equilibrium
strategy of i be written ð ~mai ; ~mhi Þ with ~mai : Ai !Ai and ~mhi : Ai ! Hi. It is an
equilibrium for every agent i of type ai to announce the message ðai; 0Þ,
because truthtelling is an equilibrium of the original mechanism, and because
the ‘‘extra’’ transfers can only yield negative expected payoffs when the other
agents tell the truth. For the same reason there exist no equilibrium in which
all agents announce their true types ( ~maj ðajÞ ¼ aj for all j and all aj) and in
which we have ~mhi 6¼ 0 for some agent i. Therefore in any other candidate
equilibrium, at least one agent, say agent 1, must lie about his type:
~ma1ða1Þ 6¼ a1 for some a1. However, whatever j (lying or not), ~maj has to be a
bijection. Otherwise, some a00j 2Aj would never be announced by agent j,
and by (16), for any i 6¼ j and forM large enough, any positive multiple of the
function defined by
hiðaiÞ ¼ 1 if aj 6¼ a
00
j ;
M if aj ¼ a00j ;

would belong to Hi, and agent i would have no best response (a large multiple
of hi would always be better than any chosen announcement). So, choose
i 6¼ 1 and let c be the inverse function of ~mai. Then c is a bijection fromAi to
Ai which is different from the identity, so that, by hypothesis, there are
some ~ai 2 Ai and some ~ti : Ai ! < satisfying (17). Any hi equal to k~ti, with
k > 0, belongs to Hi and, because the greater the k the better the response for
agent i of type ~ai, we cannot get any equilibrium other than the truthtelling
one. The lemma is proved. j
Theorem 10 is now a simple consequence of the second lemma:
Lemma 2. If condition (15) holds, then for all i and all non trivial bijections
c : Ai !Ai, there exist ~ai 2Ai and ~ti : Ai ! < satisfying (17).
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Proof. Choose any agent i and any bijection c : Ai !Ai, not equal to the
identity. There exists a state of nature ~a such that ~ai 6¼ c1ð~aiÞ (or
cð~aiÞ 6¼ ~ai) and such that
pð~ai j ~aiÞ > pðai j aiÞ; for all a 2A with ai 6¼ ~ai: ð19Þ
We obtain
pð~ai j ~aiÞ > pðc1ð~aiÞ j aiÞ for all ai: ð20Þ
Now, for any g > 0, let the transfer function ~ti be defined by
~tiðc1ð~aiÞÞ ¼ 1
~tiðaiÞ ¼ g for all ai 6¼ c1ð~aiÞ:
Note that
X
ai2Ai
~tiðaiÞpðcðaiÞ j ~aiÞ
¼ ~tiðc1ð~aiÞÞpð~ai j ~aiÞ  gð1 pð~ai j ~aiÞÞ
¼ ð1þ gÞpð~ai j ~aiÞ  g
and that for ai 6¼ ~ai
X
ai2Ai
~tiðaiÞpðai j aiÞ
¼ ~tiðc1ð~aiÞÞpðc1ð~aiÞ j aiÞ  gð1 pðc1ð~aiÞ j aiÞÞ
¼ ð1þ gÞpðc1ð~aiÞ j aiÞ  g:
Then, equation (20) implies
X
ai2Ai
~tiðaiÞpðcðaiÞ j ~aiÞ >
X
ai2Ai
~tiðaiÞpðai j aiÞ for all ai 6¼ ~ai:
Choose g just large enough so that the left hand side of this inequality is
positive while the right hand side is negative for all ai. Then the transfer
function ~ti satisfies (17). The result follows. j
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have solved the problem of implementation of all decision
rules with transferable utility: condition B is necessary and sufficient for a
solution to exist. We have also shown that, for nearly all information struc-
tures, any decision rule can be implemented by constructing a balanced
transfer rule of the ‘‘scoring rule’’ type. This constructive result, under con-
dition B, is an important adjunction to the other (but disjoint) case where a
balanced transfer rule can be explicitly given to implement any efficient
decision rule, namely the case of independence of types.
This implies that we can solve constructively the existence problem for a
large part of the information structures that satisfy condition C, which is
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weaker than both condition B and independence, and, as shown in
d’Aspremont et al. (2003) weaker than all other conditions that have been
proposed in the literature. Furthermore, condition C has an immediate
interpretation. However, the paper has shown that it is not necessary to
guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules. To prove that, we have
provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementation of
efficient decision rules, but the interpretation of this new condition remains to
be clarified.
Finally, we have produced conditions that guarantee unique implemen-
tation. It seems very difficult to weaken them significantly, without making
joint assumptions on the utility functions and on the probability distribu-
tions. Similar techniques are applicable to auctions, as shown in d’Aspremont
et al. (1999).
Many questions which we do not tackle here are still open, even if we
concentrate on efficient mechanisms in the first best sense. More work should
be devoted to issues such as risk aversion and limited transferability,23 ex-post
and interim individual rationality constraints24 (ex-ante individual rationality
creates no difficulty as theorem 1 shows), and the comparisons of various
concepts of efficiency, durability, renegotiation proofness or robustness to
coalitions.25
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